Virgina proposes a rule requiring mandatory malpractice insurance, according to a Virginia State Bar press release. The proposed rule is here.

When defendant waives counsel and has standby counsel, it appears that he cannot pursue an ineffectiveness claim against standby counsel. Even assuming that he can, he fails to satisfy Strickland here. Gripper v. United States, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55964 (D. N.C. July 2, 2008):

Whether Petitioner can even assert an ineffective assistance of counsel claim against standby counsel is suspect since Petitioner waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and chose to represent himself during his criminal proceedings. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975). When a defendant does so, the trial court, as it did for Petitioner here, may appoint standby counsel to assist the pro se defendant. Id. at 834 n. 46. However, there is "no constitutional right to hybrid representation," where the defendant "share[s] the duties of conducting [his] defense with a lawyer." United States v. Schmidt, 105 F.3d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984)). Without a constitutional right to standby counsel, a defendant generally cannot prove standby counsel was ineffective. United States v. Cochrane, 985 F.2d 1027, 1029 n.1 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting ineffective assistance of standby counsel argument in this context without foreclosing argument in future); United States v. Windsor, 981 F.2d 943, 947 (7th Cir. 1992) ("court knows of no constitutional right to effective assistance of standby counsel"); United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34, 55 (2d Cir. 1998) ("without a constitutional right to standby counsel, a defendant is not entitled to relief for ineffectiveness of standby counsel") (citing Schmidt, supra).

I've been saying this publicly for over 20 years:

§ 1:1, Rule 5: Say nothing or do nothing that you would be afraid to read about in the newspaper or in a transcript or hear in a courtroom some day.
. . .
b. Always assume that the client is recording you.

See Philadephia Daily News two days ago: 17 rounded up as part of 'Operation Delco Nostra', where a lawyer was recorded by a client and arrested for conspiracy to commit perjury:

When Monacello realized he and others were under investigation, he asked his attorney Gregory Quigley to meet with an associate who received a grand-jury subpoena at his law firm last Jan. 8.

Prepping him on how to lie, Quigley instructed the witness: "You have six options before you lie: yes, no, I don't know, I don't recall, [the] Fifth, lie." The attorney was referring to pleading the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination.

"Once they give you immunity, then you can commit perjury," Quigley told the cooperating witness, who secretly recorded the conversation.

Quigley was charged with conspiracy to commit perjury, witness intimidation and obstruction of justice.

(Hat tip to Peter Goldberger)

Defendant corporation's voluntary disclosure of a computer hard drive by a consent search which it permitted the government to copy was a waiver of attorney-client privilege in the hard drive. United States v. General Maritime Management (Portugal) L.D.A., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55163 (S.D. Tex. July 21, 2008).

In a move dangerous in both its Fourth and Sixth Amendment implications, a Collin County Texas district judge issued a search warrant for a criminal defense lawyer's office when the lawyer resisted a subpoena. The prosecutor apparently seeks to disqualify defense counsel from the case so he can testify as a witness. For a news article see Detectives Seize Documents From Murder-For-Hire Suspect's Attorney from Channel 5 in Dallas/Ft. Worth.

Blogs are Collin County Observer (with background), Grits for Breakfast, and Simple Justice.

This is almost Kafkaesque. Don't like the defense lawyer? Search his office and disqualify him to make him a witness to your case. Except that it isn't supposed to work that way in the United States. The law recognizes this predicament already; assuming the evidence gets in at all. Except maybe in Texas where anything is possible, operating under the bizarro world of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, a court so reactionary and procedural that SCOTUS reverses it as much or more as the purportedly liberal Ninth Circuit.

As the Talking Heads say, more on this as it develops.

Does the First Amendment protect a criminal defense lawyer's popular blog that called a trial judge an "evil, unfair witch" and "seemingly mentally ill"? Such is the travails of a Broward County criminal defense lawyer, discussed on Law.com's Attorney Argues His 'Witch' Comments About Judge Are Protected Speech. A previous Law.com article is here.

I've said far worse about judges, and in public, but not on a blog. Can I be disciplined too? What about truth as a defense?

On the blog today is the result of a poll that showed the abysmally low ratings of the judge targeted.

New article: Fred Zacharias, Fitting Lying to the Court into the Central Moral Tradition of Lawyering, 58 Case West. L. Rev. ___ (2008).

An attorney's failure to cite unpublished authority contrary to his position is not a violation of candor to the tribunal because it is not "controlling authority." The court was clearly troubled by this decision, however, but only to the extent is seems offended by the attorney not citing a case with no binding authority which it admits is the law. Brundage v. Estate of Carambio, A-56-07 (N.J. July 15, 2008).

A lawyer in California was indicted with a PI for the PI's wiretapping in an investigation for the lawyer. See NLJ: Christensen Case a 'Wake-Up' Call for Lawyers on Use of Private Eyes:

Regardless of what happens in the criminal case against Terry Christensen, the Los Angeles lawyer accused of paying celebrity sleuth Anthony Pellicano to illegally wiretap some of his opponents, many lawyers are thinking twice about the way they work with private investigators.

Defendant moved to set aside his guilty plea for burglary which was to be concurrent to a federal sentence. After his plea, the USMS refused to take custody of the defendant, and that led to the motion to withdraw the plea. The motion of necessity involved a claim his public defender was ineffective. The public defender had a conflict of interest in arguing her own ineffectiveness. State v. Toney, 97,326 (Kan. App. July 11, 2008):

With regard to the first question, we are persuaded that Toney's public defender had divided loyalties at the hearing. Her purported ineffectiveness in investigating Toney's case prior to the plea was critical to her client's motion to withdraw plea. In order to faithfully and effectively represent Toney at the hearing, the public defender would be obligated to advocate and prove her own professional ineffectiveness. On the other hand, in order to defend herself against Toney's allegations of ineffectiveness, the public defender would be required to advocate against her client's legal position. This obviously placed the public defender in a tenuous position.

Similar divided loyalties were highlighted in Lopez v. Scully, 58 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 1995), wherein the defendant sought to withdraw his guilty plea because of coercion allegedly exerted by his attorney. The Second Circuit observed, "To argue in favor of his client's motion would require admitting serious ethical violations and possibly subject [counsel] to liability for malpractice; on the other hand, '[a]ny contention by counsel that defendant's allegations were not true would ... contradict his client.'" 58 F.3d at 41.

In the present case, Toney's public defender candidly acknowledged her conflict to the district court. The prosecutor concurred with this assessment on the additional ground that both the chief public defender and the public defender would be necessary witnesses in support of Toney's claim. This situation could implicate ethical considerations. See Kansas Rule of Professional Conduct 3.7 (2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 523).

We are persuaded that the subject matter of Toney's legal argument and his public defender's in-court acknowledgment of divided loyalties were sufficient to establish a conflict of interest at the time of the hearing on the motion to withdraw plea.

. . .

Some jurisdictions have concluded as a general matter that "[c]ounsel cannot be expected to argue his or her own ineffectiveness." State v. Ballew, 89 Ohio St. 3d 204, 205, 729 N.E.2d 753 (2000); see United States v. Del Muro, 87 F.3d 1078, 1080 (9th Cir. 1996); Sullivan v. United States, 721 A.2d 936, 937 (D.C. 1998); State v. Molina, 271 Neb. 488, 535, 713 N.W.2d 412 (2006). The Illinois Court of Appeals has held, for example, that "[a] per se conflict of interest arises when attorneys argue motions in which they allege their own ineffectiveness." People v. Keener, 275 Ill. App. 3d 1, 5, 655 N.E.2d 294 (1995).

"Kansas has not recognized a per se conflict of interest with regard to the attorney-client relationship." State v. Robertson, 30 Kan. App. 2d 639, 641, 44 P.3d 1283 (2002).

The facts of this case do not require us to decide–and we decline to consider–whether defense counsel may properly advocate his or her own ineffectiveness and thereby avoid a claim that divided loyalties adversely affected counsel's performance.

Allegedly overagressive handshake with a federal prosecutor led to a defense lawyer being charged with assaulting a federal officer. The Sun-Sentinel.com reports that the government dropped the case. The handshake occurred after a hearing involving the defense lawyer's husband's federal probation.

Marshal Robert Kremenik was in the courtroom when Brewer Rentas insisted on shaking hands with Keene. The prosecutor refused at first, he said, but Brewer Rentas persisted, following Keene.

"Brewer forcefully grabbed onto Keene's right hand and squeezed it, pulling Keene toward her, forcing Keene off balance," Kremenik wrote in his report. "With Keene in hand, Brewer made an upward, then a quick downward motion and pulled Keene toward the ground moving her forward, almost causing Keene to fall to the ground."

Gilberto Pay, a court security officer, told Kremenik that Brewer Rentas "almost pulled her arm out of the socket."

Update: The Denver Post reports today that Faux lawyer confesses he's a sham, stating that Howard O. Kieffer has admitted in a letter to the judge that he is not licensed to practice law.

See the prior post of June 22 here: Non-lawyer holding self out as lawyer?

(Hat tip to Lisa Wayne.)

An criminal defense lawyer was suspended indefinitely by the Ohio Supreme Court today for abandoning clients and failing to refund unearned fees or keep unearned fees in an identifiable trust account. Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Lawson, 2008-Ohio-3340 (Ohio July 9, 2008). The respondent's good character and drug addiction mitigated punishment down from presumptive disbarment for similar offenders.

A lawyer arranged for temporary release for a client from jail on a DV case to go to a social security disability hearing. While driving back to the jail, the client pulled a knife on the lawyer, bound his hands with his belt, and abducted him. Video here. In the video, we can see a motion to be relieved in the criminal case. See also the Herald Bulletin.

NY's 1st Dept. holds an oral agreement for a $150,000 "premium fee" at the conclusion of the case, only contemplated in the fee agreement to the extent that one would be discussed at the close of the case, is unenforceable. Sheresky Aronson & Mayefsky, LLP v. Whitmore, 2008 NY Slip Op 06175 (1st Dept. July 8, 2008) (from the Legal Professsion Blog).

Two Indiana Public Defenders resigned from a murder case, with the assent of the trial judge, for pay issues. See Herald Bulletin:

Nearly four years after prosecutors brought murder charges against Rex David Delph, his longtime public defenders have withdrawn from the case, saying the county is unwilling to pay about $95,000 for their services and experts to testify at trial and further review evidence. It’s the latest twist in the years-long legal saga, and possibly jeopardizes Delph’s chances of a fair trial.

Attorneys Zaki Ali and Joseph Cleary filed a joint motion to withdraw from the case Thursday. Madison Circuit Court Judge Fredrick Spencer asked the two to withdraw in late June if they couldn’t negotiate with the Madison County Public Defender Board to lower the mounting costs associated with Delph’s defense.

. . .

The Public Defender Board — attorneys Max Howard, Ron Fowler and Ted Smith — refused June 23 to pay the nearly $95,000 estimated in further costs to defend Delph at trial. About $150,000 has already been spent over the last four years. In a letter to Spencer, Ali and Cleary said any negotiations are impossible because of the costs associated with anticipated expert testimony and their attorneys fees.

“With all due respect, requesting that we negotiate something with the Public Defender Board is essentially a request that we compromise Mr. Delph’s right to effective assistance of counsel,” the attorneys write. “I think you would agree our two week estimate for trial is reasonable. We do not see any way to negotiate as to that.

In the Southern District of Florida blog is this post about how Miami lawyers handle withdrawal and assuming defense of a criminal case:

Bill Barzee was headed into the FDC yesterday when he ran into Benson Weintraub on the way out. They ran into each other in front of the tower building. Apparently words were exchanged about one of Bill's clients. Benson told Bill that he was taking over the case. He told Bill to go back to his office and write him a check. He told Bill that there was no need to go into the jail. This led to a further exchange of words...

Benson then attacked Bill, punching him twice in the face. Bill was carrying his briefcase in one hand and his jacket in the other. Bill then tried to push and kick Benson away. He put Benson in a headlock and subdued him until the Marshals came and broke it up.

Benson told others that he cold-cocked Bill because of Bill's comments."

This is only one version of the matter. Read the comments in the blog for more.

(Hat tip to Peter Goldberger.)

The Legal Profession Blog reports today that an assistant misdemeanor prosecutor was disbarred for fixing cases. No word on the defense lawyer mentioned who was doing it.

A story in the Chicago Sun-Times and a related paper mentions that a murder defendant has been awaiting trial in Cook County for six years, 36 more than five years, 430 more than two years.

Cases get delayed for various reasons. Critics say both prosecutors and defense attorneys game the system, with prosecutors wanting time to find witnesses, and defense attorneys hoping evidence will fade. Some county judges are reputedly slower than others at moving cases along. The inmates waiting the longest tend to face the most serious charges.

One way to speed up cases is to add judges. The Chicago Appleseed Fund for Justice last year found that Cook County criminal courts should have 65 judges, but have just 40.

That number's about to go to 45. "The introduction of five additional judges will go a long way to alleviate the problems of old cases," said Criminal Court Presiding Judge Paul Biebel.

Also needed are more prosecutors and defense attorneys, Fasano said. Judges need ways to enforce case timelines, even if both parties agree to delays, said Fasano.

On September 9th, there is this post about plagiarizing an article being an ethical violation.

Yesterday, we see in the NY Times that a plagiarist has been nominated by President Bush to the D.C. District Court. Ironically, he worked on the toughest judicial nominees for the White House. He blames it on negligent work habits.

The Times article never uses the P-word, instead using "copying." How genteel. If it walks like a duck .... Are we afraid of a potential judicial nominee who might get confirmed?

Prof. Deborah Rhode questions the bona fides of someone so accused to be a judge but it doesn't bother Sen. Arlen Specter, so sayeth the Times:

Deborah L. Rhode, an authority on legal ethics at Stanford, said the retraction by the Supreme Court Economic Review was “extremely unusual” and amounted to “a textbook case of conduct that casts doubt on someone’s fitness for judicial office.”

“That’s a serious form of misconduct in an academic career,” Ms. Rhode said. “I would think it would be viewed equally seriously in a judicial career. In my judgment, that would be disqualifying.”

In an interview, Senator Arlen Specter, the Pennsylvania Republican who was chairman of the Judiciary Committee until last year, said he had known for some time about the questions concerning Mr. O’Neill’s scholarship.

“I heard him out on it and put it in the balance of everything else I knew about him,” Mr. Specter said. “I believe he is an excellent prospect for the district court.”

This is the Westlaw post:

15 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1

Supreme Court Economic Review, 2007

RETRACTION OF IRRATIONALITY AND THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 12 SCER 139 (2004) BY MICHAEL E. O'NEILL

The Editors of the Supreme Court Economic Review

Copyright © 2007 by The University of Chicago; The Editors of the Supreme Court Economic Review

Substantial portions of Irrationality and the Criminal Sanction, 12 SCER 139 (2004), by Michael E. O'Neill, were appropriated without attribution from Anne C. Dailey's book review, Striving for Rationality, 86 Virginia Law Review 349 (2000). Professor O'Neill's article is therefore withdrawn.

The article at 12 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 139 has been purged from Westlaw.

Update Monday: ABAJournal.com today.

—Semmes Luckett, a Clarksdale, Mississippi lawyer (who I am informed represented many Mississippi school districts in resisting desegregation, which is borne out by looking at his cases on Westlaw or Lexis)

Today, read Thomas Paine's Common Sense, February 14, 1776, and then the Declaration of Independence.

This is my July 4th ritual.

Correction and Update: In a discussion Feb. 24, 2010 with Gerald Goldstein, I discovered that this quote is from Semmes Luckett the younger, the son of the lawyer mentioned above. This Semmes Luckett was a 1959 college roommate and longtime friend of Hunter S. Thompson. See Conversations with Hunter S. Thompson (Beef Torrey and Kevin Simonson, eds.) 77-78 (2008).