An attorney's federal conviction for obstruction of justice for counseling a client to destroy a flash drive with evidence that was pertinent to a federal investigation required disbarment because it is essentially the same as the NY offense of tampering with evidence. In re Coren (1st Dept. July 1, 2010) (he was also convicted of mail fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering, but they were not discussed).

Defendants' Faretta hearing lasted "days" and resulted in defendants' self-representation which they insisted upon. After conviction they claimed error. It wasn't. "The record clearly shows that the defendants are fools, but that is not the same as being incompetent." "But the behavior of the defendants during the trial in this case, while occasionally wacky, was not disruptive or defiant. ... The defendants’ courtroom behavior, although eccentric at times, would not have justified, let alone required, the involuntary deprivation of their constitutional right to represent themselves." "They were examined by a psychiatrist and found to be fine. In the absence of any mental illness or uncontrollable behavior, they had the right to present their unorthodox defenses and argue their theories to the bitter end." (The standard of review of the Faretta claim is disputed, but does not have to be decided here.) United States v. Johnson, 08-10147 (9th Cir. July 7, 2010), the first two paragraphs:

Defendants Kurt F. Johnson and Dale Scott Heineman were indicted for conspiracy and multiple counts of mail fraud related to their illegitimate debt-elimination business. They were adamant in their desire to represent themselves and assert an absurd legal theory wrapped up in Uniform Commercial Code gibberish. Both defendants were examined by a psychiatrist and found to have no diagnosable mental disorder. Thereafter, the district court conducted Faretta hearings spanning several days in which the defendants were extensively advised of their right to counsel and the disadvantages of self-representation. The judge practically begged them to accept counsel but they refused. The district court found that the defendants were competent to represent themselves and that such was their constitutional right. Defendants now contend that Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008), decided by the Supreme Court after their trial concluded, required the district court to terminate their self-representation because of what they describe as their “nonsensical” legal “antics” after the trial began. They say they may have been competent to stand trial but not to represent themselves.

The record clearly shows that the defendants are fools, but that is not the same as being incompetent. Under both Faretta and Edwards, they had the right to represent themselves and go down in flames if they wished, a right the district court was required to respect. There was no legal or medical basis to foist a lawyer on them against their will.

Defendants Squeezed by Georgia’s Tight Budget by Adam Liptak on NYTimes.com:

When the State of Georgia ran out of money to pay the lawyers for a man facing the death penalty, the prosecutor, of all people, had an idea. He asked the judge to appoint two overworked public defenders instead, identifying them by name.

The judge went along. The Georgia Supreme Court, by a 4-to-3 vote, endorsed the arrangement in March, saying the defendant, Jamie R. Weis, should have accepted the new lawyers to help solve the state’s budget impasse.

The adversary system does not ordinarily let prosecutors pick their opponents. Indeed, most states do not allow established relationships between lawyers and their clients to be interrupted for any but the most exceptional reasons.

. . .

“If you’re going to seek capital punishment, you’re going to have to pay for it,” Mr. Fletcher said in an interview the other day. “If we’re going to have harsh laws, at least we should fulfill our constitutional obligations.”

As for the Weis case, he asked, “Why should the district attorney be involved in deciding who will represent people?”