SYLLABUS: The assistant state public defenders in the state public defender’s central appellate office located in the state’s capital city and the assistant state public defenders in the state public defender’s trial branch offices located in four different counties are not automatically considered lawyers associated in a firm for purposes of imputing conflicts of interest under Prof. Cond. Rule 1.10(a). If an appellate state public defender does not provide assistance to a trial branch state public defender in a trial matter, there is no ethical reason to impute a conflict of interest when an appellate attorney is asked to conduct a merit review, prosecute an appeal, or pursue a postconviction remedy asserting ineffectiveness of trial counsel in that matter. The appellate state public defenders are not associated with the trial branch state public defenders in that matter. But, if an appellate state public defender does provide assistance to a trial branch state public defender in a trial matter, it would be appropriate under the ethical rules to impute a conflict of interest when an appellate attorney is asked to conduct a merit review, prosecute an appeal, or pursue a postconviction remedy asserting ineffectiveness of trial counsel in that matter. The appellate state public defenders are associated with the trial branch state public defenders in that matter.

There is not a per se conflict of interest when an appellate assistant state public defender in the central appellate office conducts a merit review, asserts an appeal, or pursues a postconviction remedy asserting that another assistant state public defender in a branch office rendered ineffective assistance at trial. Under Prof. Cond. Rule 1.7(a)(2), whether an appellate state public defender in the central office has a conflict of interest in asserting ineffectiveness of an assistant state public defender in a trial branch office will depend upon whether there is a substantial risk that the appellate lawyer’s ability to consider, recommend, or carry out an appropriate course of action for the defendant is limited by the appellate lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client, or a third person, or by the lawyer’s own personal interests. This will always be a factual determination in each matter. If an appellate assistant state public defender in the central office has a significant close personal relationship or unyielding institutional loyalty to the trial assistant state public defender, it is likely there is a substantial risk of a material limitation on the appellate representation in that matter. Or, if an appellate assistant state public defender in the central office has provided assistance to an assistant state public defender in a trial matter, it is likely that there is a substantial risk that the appellate lawyer’s ability to consider, recommend, or carry out an appropriate course of action for that client will be materially limited by the appellate lawyer’s own personal interest arising from involvement in the trial matter, when asked to conduct a merit review, prosecute an appeal, or pursue a postconviction remedy asserting ineffectiveness of trial counsel in that matter.

Twenty years ago, I wrote "Sex, Clients, and the Criminal Defense Lawyer," Champion 29 (Sept.-Oct. 1990), and the subject is in § 13:25 of the Treatise.

A study of Chicago-area courts found that public defenders often are just as effective as private lawyers in persuading judges to grant bail, accept plea bargains and sentence defendants appropriately.

But for some defendants, the study found, retaining a private lawyer may be money well-spent, according to Miller-McCune. The bimonthly magazine, which focuses on public policy and academic researched, is published by the Miller-McCune Center, a nonprofit in Santa Barbara, Calif.

For white defendants, having a private lawyer makes it 2.7 times more likely that they will get bail. And black defendants with a private lawyer are twice as likely to get the original charge reduced, the article reports.

{¶ 3} On the third day of the hearing before a panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, the parties submitted stipulations that the respondent had billed the county for 3451.4 hours for appointed-counsel services in 2006, that a portion of the time she billed was false and fraudulent, and that her conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(5), 1-102(A)(6), and 2-106(A). The panel accepted these stipulations and found that in addition to billing more than 24 hours in a day, respondent’s submissions to the court also aver that she worked 14 to 24 hours on numerous occasions. In one 96-hour period, respondent billed 90.3 hours, and in a separate 144-hour period, she billed 139.5 hours. Additionally, the board found that respondent admitted that she had double billed the general division of the court for work she performed in a capital case and that she had returned the unearned portion of those fees.

{¶ 4} Based upon the parties’ stipulations and its own factual findings, the panel and board concluded, and we agree, that respondent’s conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(5), 1-102(A)(6), and 2-106(A).

The chief judge in Fayette County, Ga., abruptly resigned earlier this year when it came out that he was having an affair with an assistant public defender working in his courtroom.

But that wasn't the end of it. The assistant PD resigned, too, and now the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council has hired a former state bar president to determine whether the relationship between then-Chief Judge Paschal English and Kim Cornwell compromised any criminal cases, reports the Atlanta Journal-Constitution.

The outcome of former bar president Bryan Cavan's probe could affect as many as 450 criminal cases. Meanwhile, District Attorney Scott Ballard says his chief investigator found no wrongdoing concerning the criminal cases at issue.

Of course not; the state never does because they don't want to look at the possibility of changing outcomes. If anything, one would think that the influenced outcomes favored the defense. But do they always? How about the occasional conviction to avoid attention, a la Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 (1997), of Greylord fame? Just because some of her clients were convicted doesn't mean that they should not look there too.

Criticized by some for his unusual participation in helping the feds establish a case against a drug suspect, “I had a personal struggle with myself whether to get involved in that,” the 52-year-old Haddock told U.S. Magistrate Judge F.A. Gossett III yesterday. “But I could not live with the fact that this man would be walking the streets. I had to do it.”

Haddock was paid $47,000 by the feds for his time and relocation costs, to protect him once his role as an informant became known, the newspaper reports. He and the feds say he was not acting as Williams' attorney when he recorded their conversations.

Must not have had much of a practice to Cross the Rubicon like this, and for thirty pieces of silver, no less.

U.S. District Judge Christine Arguello sentenced Kieffer to 57 months in prison for a count of wire fraud and a count of making false statements and 37 months on a third count of contempt of court.

Arguello decided the three counts should run concurrent to one another for a total of 57 months. The sentence will run consecutive to a 51-month prison term Kieffer is already serving for a similar conviction in North Dakota.

"The root of your scheme and your conduct has been pure deception," Arguello told Kieffer. "You have shown a profound disrespect for the court system."

Kieffer is a con artist with a criminal record going back 30 years. In 1989, he was sentenced to federal prison for filing false tax returns and got out in 1993.

By 1997, he was acting as a lawyer, claiming he graduated from law school and advertising his legal defense services online.

Prior posts are here, here, and here.

More embarrassing is the reference to his CLE on sentencing here for the Federal Defender Services of Wisconsin:

Howard O. Kieffer was brought here by Federal Defender Services of Wisconsin to talk to local lawyers about the ins and outs of state and federal criminal prison sentences at a November 2007 conference. Kieffer was identified as a graduate of Antioch Law School.

Writes Heffernan, “Leaders need to take seriously a century’s evidence that 1) overwork doesn’t make us productive, it makes us stupid, 2) looking away from a problem is often the best way to solve it, and 3) burnout is what happens when people are asked to work in ways that obliterate all other parts of their lives.”